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what policies can protect the region better from world crises and shocks, and to which extent should it rely on a strategy of close trade and financial integration into a world economy punctuated by shocks and crises? This paper addresses the latter questions in three steps.
First, by assessing empirically the sensitivity of growth in the region's seven major economies during 1990-2009 to large number of structural and cyclical factors, based on high-frequency panel-data estimations. Second, by using the latter results to decompose the amplitude of GDP reductions in both recessions according to the individual and combined contribution of the different growth factors. Third, to derive the main implications of the results for the choice of macroeconomic regimes and development strategies.
Introduction 1
The international economy is recovering from the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. While the origin of the crisis was at the heart of the world's financial centers, the transmission mechanisms of the crisis have been different among regions and countries. The financial crisis in major industrial economies was only halted by massive financial support and rescue programs implemented, while the free fall of demand, output, and employment was only reversed by the combination of large-scale financial intervention and the most aggressive macroeconomic expansion recorded in history. All other economies where financial systems were not in crisis -industrial and developing alike -suffered from international contagion from the financial centers' crisis and the industrial world's recession through conventional financial and trade transmission channels.
This global financial crisis has raised concerns in developing economies about their macroeconomic policy frameworks and their development strategies. Among the questions raised by the crisis are: which policies can protect them best from world crises and shocks?, what role does domestic demand play in shielding them from crises?, and to which extent should they rely on a strategy of close trade and financial integration into a world economy punctuated by shocks and crises?
Latin America has been strongly affected by the international crisis and recession since late 2008. In comparison to previous crises, how has Latin America coped with the global crisis, which has been the role of different transmission mechanisms, and how have the regions structural conditions affected the region's sensitivity to foreign shocks? This paper addresses the latter issues by assessing the performance of growth in Latin America's seven major economies during 1990-2009, using high-frequency panel-data estimations. The growth model (which encompasses long-term structural and short-term cyclical and policy determinants of growth) identifies the main channels of transmission of foreign shocks (trade and financial, quantity and price channels) and possible interactions between foreign shocks and domestic structural conditions (including measures of external trade and financial openness), and allowing for structural changes observed within the sample period.
Then the estimation results are used to decompose growth into long-term and cyclical determinants to explain the amplitude of GDP decline during the 1998-99 Asian crisis and the 2008-09 global crisis. This allows to quantify and identify: (i) the differences in unconditional and conditional effects of the global crisis for LAC between both crises, (ii) the role of structural and policy variables that have improved the region's resilience to foreign shocks and crises, and (iii) the main implications for the evaluation of the dominant development strategy adopted by the region since the 1990s.
Section 2 of the paper describes the growth performance of Latin America during 1990 America during -2009 and justifies the focus on the two regional recessions: the 1998-99 recession associated to the Asian crisis and the 2008-09 recession caused by the global financial crisis. Section 3 discusses the growth model and the choice of short and long-term growth factors and their relation to previous literature. Section 4 reports and discusses panel-data estimation results for the region's growth performance. Section 5 uses the latter results to decompose the amplitude of both recessions, comparing the very different roles of external and domestic growth factors in both recessions. Section 6 draws the implications of the previous results for the choice of policy regimes and development strategies in support of the region's growth and resilience to foreign shocks and crises. Final remarks close the paper.
Latin America's growth performance
This study focuses on Latin America's seven largest economies -Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela -that account jointly for 91% of Latin America's 2008 GDP. The time sample spans the quarters ranging from 1990q1 through 2009q4. The main variable of interest is the countries' annualized quarterly growth rate of seasonallyadjusted real GDP. GDP data are from National Accounts and follow standard conventions and are seasonally adjusted. 2 Figure 1 reflects 4 periods of at least two consecutive quarters of negative average growth in the seven countries that represent the LAC region in our study : 1998q3 -1992q2, 2001q3 -2002q1, 2002q4 -2003q1, and 2008q4 -2009q1 . and generalized crisis in Argentina and a temporary collapse of oil production in Venezuela associated to a strike in the sector), with almost no consequences for other countries in the region. In contrast to the two latter country-specific episodes, 5 of the 7 countries suffered a recession during the 1998-99 regional contraction, and all 7 countries suffered a recession during the 2008-09 contraction. Hence we focus in this study on the two latter recessions only. Now let's turn to date the precise extension of the recession. One possibility is to stick to the two windows of consecutive negative growth of the aggregate growth, depicted in Figure 1 .
However, this aggregate regional growth behavior may mask significant country heterogeneity that does not show in the regional average. Therefore we exploit the full paneldata sample to test for recessions combining alternative recession windows for the 1998-99 recession with different windows for the 2008-09 recession, using panel-data estimations.
3
We find that the best results are those for the four-quarter window spanning 1998q3 -1999q2 (Asian Crisis) and the two-quarter window 2008q4 -2009q1 (global financial crisis).
The latter results are identical to the recession periods for aggregate LAC GDP, depicted in However, for the purpose of the final choice of contraction periods relevant for our growth decomposition analysis performed below, we also consider the behavior of output gaps around recessions (Figure 3 ). 4 The average output gap in LAC during the first recession period declines precisely during the 4-quarter window that was selected above, i.e., in 1998q3-1999q2. The output gap starts to close in 1999q3, i.e., actual GDP growth exceeds estimated trend growth since the latter quarter. However, after the second recession period the output gap continues to widen in 2009q2 and 2009q3, reflecting a weak growth recovery in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This takes us to extend the contraction period relevant for our 1998-99 growth decomposition by one quarter, to obtain a three-quarter recession period. Accordingly, we have identified 1998q3-1999q2 (4 quarters) and 2008q4-2009q2 (3 quarters) as the recession periods in this study.
For the empirical analysis carried out below, the dependent variable is the annualized quarter-to-quarter rate of growth of seasonally-adjusted real GDP. 
Growth Model
The literature on long-term growth is very wide on both theoretical and empirical sides. While theoretical studies usually analyze the role of a key growth determinants in isolation, the empirical literature takes a wider view, considering several structural and policy growth factors. Our approach is to encompass the largest possible set of structural, institutional, policy, and cyclical determinants of short and long-term growth, anchored in theory and international evidence. Next we describe the variables selected for our growth specification and their relation to previous research and empirical findings. We group our variables in five major sets.
20 years of empirical cross-country growth models have identified a large array of structural and policy variables that potentially matter for long-term growth -see, among others, Barro (1991), King and Levine (1993) , Easterly and Rebelo (1993) , Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997) , Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) , Dollar and Kraay (2002), Calderón, Fajnzylber and Loayza (2004) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) . From the latter studies we have identified five potentially important drivers of longterm growth. The first is a measure of domestic financial depth. We follow Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) , among others, in using the ratio of private domestic credit supplied by private financial institutions to GDP as a proxy of financial depth. A deep and efficient capital market promotes long-run growth since it allows for better risk diversification by trading, pooling, and hedging financial instruments. A deep capital market is more likely to channel resources to profitable investment projects, as well as to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems that lead to inefficient resource allocation. 5 Next we include secondary school enrollment as a proxy for schooling and human capital investment, as by Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) Bank (2009), and Soto (2010) . IMF (2009c) shows evidence that links financial crises to deep recessions that lead to persistent medium GDP.
Our third set of growth determinants are five foreign cyclical variables that embody the transmission of foreign trade and financial shocks, considering both price and quantity shocks. All are defined in a way such that they are exogenous to countries in general and domestic growth in particular. On the trade side we include the growth rates of the terms of trade (a conventional factor in cross-country growth regressions), of GDP of trading partners (the weighted real GDP growth of countries engaged in trade with any given country), and of aggregate world exports. The price variable is a conventional regressor found in many crosscountry growth studies while the two quantity variables are infrequently used as growth determinants. However, we think that quantum drivers of external demand for domestic exports are potentially important determinants of cyclical growth. On the financial side we include a quantity and a price variable, which are also not found in long-term growth studies but sometimes in short-term projection models. The quantity variable is aggregate capital inflows to Latin America: higher inflows are likely to lead to higher short-term growth as foreign credit is eased and financial constraints on investment projects and durable consumption expenditures are lifted. 9 The price variable is sovereign debt spreads: when sovereign premiums rise, the cost of external financing increases, contracting domestic investment and growth.
Our fourth set of growth determinants is comprised by two domestic macroeconomic policy variables, which play an important role in short-term macroeconomic models. Our fiscal policy measure is the ratio of government consumption to GDP). The latter variable is typically used as a proxy of government burden, affecting negatively growth because of the distorting effects of government taxes. This negative effect turns up in many empirical long-term growth models (e.g., Barro 1991, among may others). However, since we use highfrequency data, government consumption can also capture a positive Keynesian aggregatedemand impact on short-term growth. Hence the net empirical impact of government consumption on high-frequency growth is ambiguous.. Our monetary policy variable is the ex-ante short-term real interest rate, defined as the nominal monetary policy rate or shortterm interest rate adjusted by a measure of inflation expectations. A higher domestic shortterm real interest rate -caused by a hike in the nominal policy rate or a decline in inflation expectations -may raise medium-term real rates through the yield curve and have a negative effect on aggregated demand and short-term output. In sum, our reduced-form model for the short and long-term behavior of growth encompasses 21 potential growth factors grouped into 5 sets of variable categories. This model implies a significant departure from the previous literature by including a large variety and number of growth regressors, and considering both linear and interaction effects. In addition, we will test for within-sample changes in the growth model, allowing for structural changes in coefficient estimates. Our aim is to test for possible changes in growth behavior as a result of policy reforms adopted in LAC in the early 2000s, after the 1998-99 Asian crises and recession. The model specification is presented in the Appendix.
Growth Estimation Results for 1990-2009
We estimate our growth model applying the fixed-effects panel-data estimator to an unbalanced set of 462 country-quarter observations. The main regression results are reported in Table 2 in stages, going from simple to more complex specifications. Column (1) presents the results without inclusion of interaction effects and without considering structural changes in coefficients. Column (2) Estimation results are satisfactory, as reflected by the overall fit of the regressions (we explain two thirds of the variation of high-frequency GDP in a panel sample of shock-prone Latin American countries) and the sign and significance of individual parameter estimates.
Most parameter estimates are quite robust to different specifications reported in columns 1-3.
We review briefly our main results. The lagged dependent variable is systematically not significant, which is probably due to the inclusion of a large number of growth determinants. . Blank cells in the second sub-column reflect non-significant structural changes, which therefore are not reported. 11 To control for possible bias stemming from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, which could be correlated to the error term, we have run alternative regressions (available on request) where we have instrumented the lagged dependent variables using lags of independent variables. The results, both for the lagged dependent variable and the independent regressors, were unchanged.
countries achieved large improvements in macroeconomic stability over the last two decades. Fiscal adjustment and public sector reforms have been reflected in lower public sector deficit and debt levels, while the adoption of new monetary regimes (in particular, inflation targeting) and more orthodox monetary policies led to lower and more stable levels of inflation. The contribution of macroeconomic stabilization to growth is reflected by the large and significant coefficients of the fiscal balance ratio to GDP and of inflation. Now let's turn to our third class of growth factors: foreign cyclical variables. We measure the contribution of five external cyclical drivers of short-term growth in open economies. On the trade side, the price variable, i.e., terms-of-trade growth, displays the correct sign but is not a statistically significant GDP growth factor. On the quantity side, trading partners' growth is not robustly significant either, but world export volume growth is a very significant growth determinant. On the financial side, the quantity variable, i.e., aggregate capital inflows to LAC, is a very significant growth factor. Finally, the cost of foreign borrowing, reflected by one of its major components, the sovereign spread, affects growth negatively but its effect is not statistically significant.
Our fourth set of growth factors is comprised by two domestic policy variables. As discussed above, government consumption has a negative effect on long-term growth and a positive expansionary effect on short-term growth. Its positive and very significant sign reported in Table 3 suggests that the latter short-term effect dominates in Latin America. Our second policy variable is the short-term real interest rate, which exhibits a significant negative effect on growth. However, monetary policy is more contractive before 2002 (with a coefficient of -0.33) than afterwards (when its coefficient declines to -0.04). The reduction in the impact of monetary policy on output growth in recent years may reflect the larger financial integration into the world economy attained during the past decade.
Finally we turn to our four interaction effects between structural variables and foreign cyclical variables. The interaction effect on growth between trade openness and trading partners is negative but not robustly significant, while the interaction effect on growth between financial openness and trading partners' growth is negative and not robustly significant. We did not have strong priors about the sign and significance of the latter interaction effects but we note that e estimated coefficient signs and significance levels are exactly opposite to those found for the world economy by Calderón, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) in long-term growth regressions. Our third interaction is between financial openness and capital inflows ton the region, which is negative and not robustly significant either. Finally, we find evidence for a positive and significant growth effect of the interaction between sovereign spreads and net external assets. As expected, this finding shows that the negative direct effect of higher sovereign spreads is dampened by a larger positive ratio of net foreign assets to GDP and exacerbated by a larger negative ratio.
Explaining the Amplitude of the 1998-99 and 2008-09 Recessions
Now we put our regression results to work by using them to explain the amplitude of LAC's GDP growth decline in the aftermath of both crises. To start, we compute the amplitude of the growth reduction in the seven sample countries during both recessions, i.e., the cumulative GDP level reduction (expressed in annualized terms) observed between the peak quarter before the recession (labeled in Figure 4 as quarter 0) and the trough quarter of our selected recession periods (labeled in Figure 4 as quarter 4 or 1999q2 for the first recession and quarter 3 or 2009q2 for the second recession). Table 3 reports the annualized recession amplitude for the seven individual countries and the region at large. The peak-to-through cumulative GDP change ranges from a GDP loss of 8.5% in Venezuela to a GDP gain of 3.4% in Mexico during the four-quarter 1998-99 recession. In contrast to the latter, the full country range is in negative terrain during the three-quarter 2008-09 recession, with cumulative GDP losses that range from 0.9% in Colombia to 11.1% in Mexico.
Simple (weighted) country averages of recession amplitudes for the region stand at -3.0% (-1.2%) for the first recession and -4.2% (-5.2%) for the second recession. By any of the latter measures, it is clear that the second recession was much deeper than the first one. Our next task is to explain a significant part of the observed simple-average recession amplitude, making use of our coefficient estimates and the changes in independent variables (and in coefficient estimates, when applicable), according to our decomposition method, summarized in the Appendix.
The results are reported in Table 4 , based on our most comprehensive regression results, those shown in column (3) of Table 2 . There we report the recession amplitude decomposition for the Asian crisis (column 1) and for the global financial crisis (column 2).
The latter column is divided into three sub-columns: the first is based on changes in explanatory variables only, the second is based on changes in estimated parameters only, and the third is the total contribution which is the sum of the two previous sub-columns.
The amplitude of the first recession is -3.0% (reported in the bottom line of Finally, the growth effects of interactions between structural conditions and foreign shocks were neutral to the first recession but deepened significantly the second recession, by 0.7%. This is not surprising because the interaction terms largely reflect the amplifying effects of the deterioration in foreign conditions observed in 2008-09 but not in 1998-99.
Implications for Policies and Growth Strategies
The evidence presented in this paper on Latin America's performance during its two last crises, 1998-99 and 2008-09, shows striking differences between the very different role played by foreign and domestic growth factors in both recessions. The first (less intense) recession was largely homemade, while the second (more intense) recession was largely due to a deteriorating world economy. The combined effect of foreign cyclical factors was positive for Latin America's growth during the first recession, while all foreign cyclical variables deteriorated sharply during the world financial crisis, explaining more than half of the last recession. In contrast to foreign variables, all domestic variables explain more than 100% of the first recession and less than half of the 2008-09 downturn.
The latter result is due to the large changes in development strategies and policy regimes that Latin America started in the 1990s and deepened in the 2000s. While populist policies have reemerged in some countries, the region's dominant development approach relies on market and private-sector development, strong commitment to global integration, adoption of sustainable macroeconomic and financial regimes, and some reform progress to make governments more effective in their provision of public goods. Next we derive the implications of our empirical findings for evaluating the region's development strategy in three key areas: macroeconomic regimes and policies, domestic financial development, and international integration of goods and financial markets.
Latin America started a major revamping of its macroeconomic policy frameworks in the 1990s, a drive that was consolidated in the 2000s. Fiscal policy had been unsustainable in many countries since the 1970s and through the early 1990s, that led to fiscal crises and hyperinflation. Fiscal orthodoxy replaced profligacy in the 1990s, a trend that was intensified in the 2000s, when a significant part of commodity windfalls was saved. In turn, fiscal policy was used as a counter-cyclical stabilizing tool during the 2008-09 recession.
Fiscal trend deficits were dramatically curtailed or turned into surpluses, and public debt levels were generally reduced to low and sustainable levels. Average public and publicly guaranteed debt fell from 30.1% of GDP in the early 1990s to 14.3% of GDP in the late 2000s (Table 5) . A final step toward further strengthening of fiscal frameworks in the regionadopting formal fiscal rules and fiscal councils -is still pending. Chile is the only country that has in place a fiscal rule since 2001.
Our results provide strong evidence on the growth impact of the latter shift in the region's fiscal policy. First, the fiscal balance makes a robust and economically large contribution to growth. Second, government consumption has a significant stabilizing effect on short-term growth. Our growth decomposition shows that the stabilizing role of government consumption was more heavily used during the 2008-09 contraction, when countries had more room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
The second regime change in macroeconomic policies was the shift from inflexible toward flexible exchange-rate regimes, largely implemented after the Asian crisis. Either forced by markets or as a result of policymakers' conviction, many countries replaced their crawling pegs or exchange-rate bands by floats, which exceptionally are of the clean type (like in Mexico) and more frequently of the dirty type, i.e., with high-frequency non-announced interventions (like in Brazil or Peru) or low-frequency pre-announced intervention periods (like in Chile). Latin America has reaped three benefits from flexible exchange rates:
avoidance of recurring currency crises (that often lead to recessions), use of nominal (and hence real) exchange-rate adjustment as a buffer against adverse foreign shocks (therefore avoiding costly unemployment and output losses), and allowing full conduct of an independent monetary policy. Restrained from excessive risk taking by reformed financial regulation and supervision -that reflects the right lessons derived from previous financial crises -the region's banks have avoided exposure to U.S. toxic assets and have generally resisted well the recession of 1998-99. In fact, no financial crises were observed during 1998-99 in a region that HAD suffered Recurring banking crises in the past, when hit by severe foreign shocks and domestic recessions. In our findings, the ratio to GDP of private credit from commercial banks contributes significantly to the region's growth. Moreover, the increase in the latter ratio had a mild stabilizing effect during the 1998-99 recession and a largeR expansionary influence during the 2008-09 recession.
Beyond banking, the region adopted capital-market reforms that boosted the development of private debt and equity markets, insurance markets, and pension funds. Financial and capital-market development is a major and robust growth determinant acting through several channels of transmission on saving and investment, and, fundamentally, on productivity growth, as shown by a long literature (e.g., Levine 2005) . Deep pension reforms in many Latin American countries have replaced state-run pay-as-you-go pension systems by defined-contribution systems managed by private companies that invest pension funds both domestically and internationally. The latter systems contribute to financial deepening (and financial opening), improve domestic corporate governance, and raise aggregate efficiency.
Hence structural pension reform can contribute significantly to economic growth, as shown in the Chilean case (Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003) .
The third key area of the region's development strategy is globalization. Latin America in general has deepened its trade and financial integration with the world economy. During the past two decades, the region has largely dismantled its massive historical barriers to trade in goods, services, and capital flows.
Latin American countries have made much progress in reducing import tariffs, eliminating Regarding financial integration, Latin America has complemented domestic financial liberalization with external financial opening, reducing restrictions on holdings, inflows and outflows of short and long-term foreign direct investment, loans, and portfolio and equity flows. Restrictions on short-term capital inflows -prevalent in some countries during the 1990s -have been abolished and/or not restarted in most countries. International financial integration leads to larger gross external asset and liability holdings, which contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources and better insurance against national idiosyncratic shocks, and hence to higher growth and lower income and output volatility. The region's progress in financial integration is reflected by a rise of the average total external asset and liability ratio to GDP from 89% in the early 1990s to 114% in the late 2000s (Table 8) . We have also found that higher financial openness has a very significant and large effect on the region's growth performance. However, while during the 1998-99 recession the GDP ratio of external asset and liability holdings increased, hence lessening the recession, the opposite occurred during 2008-09, when the significant decline of the latter ratio (reflecting in part the decline in capital inflows to the region) contributed to deepen the recession.
Despite large progress in applying a coherent and sustainable development strategy, Latin
America still faces a large pending agenda to raise growth further and to make faster progress in reducing poverty and improving income distribution. On growth the region's main shortcoming is the low level of productivity and the inadequate rate of productivity growth.
There is much room to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic markets and to facilitate the process of creative destruction. Labor markets are excessively regulated in the formal sector, leading to high structural unemployment and informal employment.
Another area where the equity and efficiency costs of inadequate public policies are very high is in education, which exhibits very low quality levels. Although much progress has been made regarding school enrollment and educational attainment, Latin American countries still rank very low in international education achievement tests, even when controlling for their per capita income levels. Public education suffers from low budgets, poor incentives, lack of accountability, and barriers to education reforms aimed at improving teaching methods and raising teachers' productivity. Finally, regional growth is hampered by wide-spread government corruption and low efficiency of public administration. Government bureaucrats are largely selected on the basis of party affiliation instead of professional merit, which is reflected not only in low quality of government bureaucracies but also their short tenure, linked to government mandates. Notable exceptions are Brazil and Chile, which have introduced, at least partly, meritocratic hiring of government managers and staff. Hence government reform at all levels -from municipalities to public enterprises and to central governments -is also a major development challenge in the region's quest to attain higher growth and more equity.
Final Remarks
We conclude that Latin America has changed significantly between the late 1990s and the 2000s. This paper's empirical results show that the region's growth rate has been raised by putting in place a better and stronger development strategy since the late 1990s. While there is still significant intra-regional heterogeneity in economic regimes and policies, the predominant development strategy is based on the adoption of prudent and rule-based macroeconomic policies, deeper and healthier financial systems and capital markets, and strong integration into world goods and capital markets. Our results show that improvements in many specific variables associated to these three areas have led to higher average growth.
Moreover, Latin America's resilience to adverse foreign shocks has been greatly improved by adopting the latter development strategy. This paper's results show that the last recessions suffered by the region were very different -in magnitude, the role of foreign shocks, and the contribution of domestic conditions and policies. The 1998-99 recession -of a smaller magnitude -was largely homemade, related to the weak macroeconomic and structural policy framework that Latin America had in place in the 1990s. In contrast, the second recession -much deeper and affecting all major Latin American economies -was largely due to deteriorating conditions in the world economy. Although much has changed in Latin America in the last two decades, there are still many impediments to achieve higher and sustained growth and better opportunities for the poor. A large reform agenda to improve the region's business environment, labor market regulations, quality of education, and government efficiency has to be tackled to raise Latin America's efficiency and equity levels. Lack of progress in the latter areas could result in frustration with macroeconomic responsibility and structural achievements, creating conditions for further spreading of populist policies that inflicted so much damage to the region in the last fifty years. To make significant progress in these areas requires improving significantly the quality and independence of the public sector, learning from successful experience of countries like Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, or Sweden.
where Y is a vector of country-quarter growth observations, X is a matrix of long-term variables, K is a matrix of domestic policy variables, M is a matrix of structural variables, Z is a matrix of foreign cyclical variables, MZ is a matrix of interactions between structural and foreign cyclical variables, μ is a vector of individual country effects that reflect unobservable country heterogeneity, ε is a vector of error terms, and i and t are country and time indexes, respectively. The regression equation also allows for unobserved country-specific effects.
We do not consider time-specific effects since they are perfectly correlated with common foreign shocks such as the capital inflows to Latin America and the growth rate of world exports.
We estimate equation (1) using the fixed effects panel-data estimator, which is adequate for panels with a large number of time observations (up to 80 quarters, 1990-2009 ) and a small number of cross-section units (7 countries). We have controlled for a few extreme events reflected in very large outliers of the dependent variable, associated to massive idiosyncratic shocks, visible in Figures 2A and 2C: Argentina (2001q3-2002q1) and Venezuela (2002q4-2003q2 and 2004q1) .
Our model is dynamic as it includes the lagged dependent variable. This may give rise to bias due to potential correlation with the error term. This problem is particularly acute in samples with small numbers of time observations, which is not our case.
13 Moreover, below we refer to alternative regression results based on IV estimation where we have instrumented the lagged dependent variable.
Decomposition of the GDP decline or amplitude of the recession is based on equation (2), as reflected by the following equation:
13 In fact, Nickell (1981) derives an expression for the bias of the lagged dependent variable when there are no exogenous regressors, showing that the bias approaches zero as the time dimension approaches infinity. Therefore our estimation method should perform well, as it is applied to samples of up to 80 quarterly observations.
Note that when we compare both crises, parameter estimates are allowed to exhibit structural changes in some quarter falling within 2000-03. Let 
In Table 4 , in column "Structural Change -NO", we report 14 Note that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not present in the decomposition. This is because it is not significant. However, this is not an adequate reason to discard that term. The right procedure is to use the parameters obtained from estimating equation (2) imposing the hypothesis of ρ=0. Since, the parameters are virtually the same using both methods, we use the parameters reported in Table 3 . 
